


**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER DIVISION**

On and for all Public and Private records,  
for all Courts, and for the House of Walker: In the Matter of



UNITED STATES, (a Federal Corporation,  
per 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15),

CASE NUMBER: 23-Cr. 662  
ARREST DATE: 08/14/2024

Plaintiff,

-against-

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW  
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION  
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

GLENROY WALKER, GLENROY WALKER;  
A/K/A WALKER, GLENROY, (A Corporate Legal  
Fiction and all other derivations and variations  
thereof by general, instituted, rightful  
Grantor/Executor of the same),

Defendant.

**COMES NOW** the wife of the natural man on the land and living Soul, Judith: of the Family McLaren, and Trustee for the GLEN WALKER TRUST Estate, hereinafter "Trustee", to hereby provide a Memorandum of Law in Support to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the above captioned criminal Complaint being heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York at Westchester County.

Trustee for the GLEN WALKER TRUST Estate respectfully declares that the Plaintiff, this Court, nor Plaintiff's Attorney, has any record or evidence that the natural man on the land and living Soul is "within" United States jurisdiction, as clarified in the challenges made by Glenroy: of the Family Walker through his Mandatory Judicial Notice of Law which was duly filed on the record of this case that was summarily denied without due process by judge Cathy Seibel. As a matter of law, the Libellees listed as Plaintiff, its Attorney and the Court in this case MUST admit to the truth that the proper legal status of Glenroy: of the Family Walker is or is not

"Without United States" by Affidavit under penalty of perjury in order to prove jurisdiction over the natural man on the land and living Soul on the record.

TITLE 28, PART V, CHAPTER 115, § 1746. "Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury."

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or Affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of Office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a Notary Public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:

(1) If executed **without the United States**: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)".

(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)".

And;

**4 USC § 72 as it applies to jurisdiction**

QUESTION: Has Congress "expressly" extended the authority of the DOJ outside "the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere" pursuant to 4 USC § 72? If so, please put on the Court Record the United States law which so "expressly" extends the authority of the DOJ outside the District of Columbia.

NOTE: At least 20 U.S. Attorneys have been asked for this and not one has been forthcoming with said United States law. The expression "without United States" is being

addressed here to determine jurisdiction over Glenroy: of the Family Walker who is not within the corporate United States District of Columbia.

4 U.S.C. § 72, which is positive law, mandates that all offices of government are restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless Congress “expressly” extends said jurisdiction to other areas by United States law.

“All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.” \*See 4 U.S.C. § 72.

United States law 4 U.S.C. § 72 provides the litmus test for the jurisdiction of every office attached to the seat of government, which includes the Department of Justice and any other “offices attached to the seat of government”.

4 U.S.C. § 72 is concerned with “where” offices of the United States can exercise their authority.

The breakdown of this law is as follows:

1. **ALL** offices attached to the seat of government are contemplated in this law and not just some offices – this includes the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), *etc.*;
2. The provisions of 4 U.S.C. § 72 **are made mandatory by Congress** by its use of the word “shall.” In other words, **this is not an optional consideration for any United States Officer (including judges) or Agency.**
3. The “exercise” of **ALL** government offices is by default limited to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” In other words, “the District of Columbia” is the starting place for jurisdiction not the exception;
4. An exception can be made to the limited jurisdiction of **ALL** offices attached to the seat of government to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” As set forth in 4 U.S.C. § 72, authority to act outside “the District of Columbia” must be “otherwise expressly provided by law.” In other words, if Congress intends to extend the authority of a particular office of the United States to areas outside “the District of Columbia,” it shall “expressly” delegate and extend said authority in United States law.
5. Any “expressly” delegated exception to the limitations of an Officer’s authority to that of “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” is to be authorized by Congress in “law.” In other words, since Congress (Legislative Branch) has the exclusive authority to create law for the United States, said exceptions will be found only in United States law and not in Codes of Regulations (Executive Branch) or in Supreme Court rulings (Judicial Branch). Only Congress by United States law can authorize or extend the authority of any government office outside “the District of Columbia,” pursuant to 4 U.S.C. § 72.

*Law venue*” of the natural man on the land and living Soul, Glenroy: of the Family Walker, for the delivery of the “corporate vessel” and juristic person, GLENROY WALKER, that is the alleged Defendant for the corporate UNITED STATES (per 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) criminal Complaint, fastened with sworn Affidavits as proof to uphold all of Glenroy: of the Family Walker’s Rights in a District of Columbia forum, for the claims, averments, indemnifications as exhibited herein, submitted in support thereof, to the Trustee within the time required by applicable statute or law of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, *et. seq.*

Trustee affirms, **FOR THE RECORD**, that Glenroy: of the Family Walker is a Neutral, Non-Combatant, under the Law of Nations, with equitable rights and remedies available to any Non-Corporate, un-enfranchised, living man upon the land. Trustee seeks Estoppel of Actors and Actors acting in excess of jurisdiction, as per *Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist.*, 17 Cal.2d 942, 948; and *Wuest v. Wuest*, 53 Cal.App.2d 339, 127 P.2d 934, 937, which held that, **“A departure by a Court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an "excess of jurisdiction."**

Trustee seeks remedy for fraud from over-zealous “Officers” of the judicial system for submitting *unsolicited unregistered securities offerings* to investors on Wall Street, using GLENROY WALKER’s own credit(s), *i.e.*, through GSA Bonds, and other Securities deposited in the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) for the benefit and inurement of the Court Registry Investment System (CRIS) while claiming to be a *neutral party* and not having a financial interest in the instant matter, is decidedly a *non-sequitur* in-law and *ultra vires*. Trustee also has knowledge of the Performance Bonds, Bid Bonds, Insurance Bonds, books, ledgers and the *interlocking equity(ties)* of the Court and its’ BAR members to a commercial “Enterprise” operated for the benefit of its members and those it serves. The facts of *interlocking equity(ties)* of the Court and its’ members, with book ledgers of said commercial enterprise maintained by the Clerks, accounts and finance

department are well established, and wherefore, the aforementioned Bonds are traded, issued and posted, in clearly stated financial reports, including, but not limited to, the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). This effectively means that the whole prosecution of this criminal Complaint is a commercial enterprise litigation and not a Common Law constitutional execution of justice under proper due process protections.

Trustee is attempting, with fervent intent, to prevent Glenroy: of the Family Walker from becoming the victim of further *contrivance* and *artifice* with *disenfranchisement* of ‘rights’ that are guaranteed, afforded and protected under federal law(s) by the Public Officers within the Union States Justice Court system now operating for a said commercial enterprise maintained by the Clerks, accounts and finance department of the Court, that is supposedly based upon the rights of the People of the *de jure* Sovereign united States Republic having a Constitution for the People, by the People and of the People, that are being systematically denied constitutionally protected rights by the corporate UNITED STATES shills and usurpers of those constitutionally protected rights under color of State and federal law artifices where the people have been denied access to a Common Law Court by a Government that has abandoned said people as *foreigners in their own (e)state*, ‘*alienated and disenfranchised*’ by declaring them “**enemies of the State**”, from their own government, who are, by systematic denial of *federally protected rights*, forced into, not a constitutional Court—but a Court for *restitution of the public debts*, and are actually being forced into quasi-Military Admiralty Maritime Courts, *duped by contrivance, artifice and force of arms* wherein *performance for indebtedness* is extracted under bills of “pains and penalties” by said judges, enforcing codes, thus violating Glenroy: of the Family Walker’s federally protected rights to a Court of Common Law, presided over by a constitutional Judge, who will faithfully perform the duty of his or her office and uphold the God-given unalienable Rights affirmed by the oath of each judge.

**Therefore, without Acceptance of Constitutions and Oaths to uphold such Constitutions, all actors would be interested parties to the cause, exhibiting partial, prejudiced, and biased decisions and opinions against the natural man on the land and living Soul, Glenroy: of the Family Walker, to promote corporate, governmental, interlocking equity(ties) and bring the scales of justice into greater imbalance.**

**THUS, THIS DOCUMENT IS HEREBY PRESENTED WITH NO APOLOGIES.**

Trustee, further, reminds the Court that **NEVER HAS THERE BEEN PRESENTED A REAL INJURED PARTY** that may state a claim, injury, damage, a registered priority lien, or other instrument proving any right, title, or interest in Affiant. Affiant cannot with any certainty ascertain the facts, or understand, the *“nature of the case”* as stated herein. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)).

Trustee accepts, as fact, that Trustee and Glenroy: of the Family Walker has sworn no oath to the Constitution, and has no other "constitutional" rights other than being a natural man and natural woman in the private sector without the United States, and as a Private Man and Private Woman, are without the United States and without United States territorial and "federal area" overlay jurisdiction per Buck Act.

Trustee hereby gives Judicial Notice that the STATE and federal government are employees of the People. Affiant has no record or evidence that the corporate “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” is anything other than an employee of the People of the *de jure* united States of America. Trustee and Glenroy: of the Family Walker cannot yield their sovereignty to any fiction that would allow the fake to rule over the Real.

This Trustee and Belligerent Claimant, Glenroy: of the Family Walker, yields no license, leave, or permit to do anything contrary to this Belligerent Claimant's un-alienable Rights, as ensured in the written documents referred to as the Constitution for the united States of America

and the Bill of Rights. Any, and all, Agents, or agencies, of any State are nothing more than "employees" of a state. Any man accused of any crime has a right to face his accuser, not a "representative" of the alleged accuser. If the "STATE" says I have injured the STATE, let the STATE be sworn in and questioned. Only a properly sworn and verified complaint from a true injured Party may witness against this natural man on the land and living Soul, Glenroy: of the Family Walker. Anything short of that is Constructive Fraud, with many other types of fraud to follow; *i.e.*, coercion, *vi et armis*, intimidation, *etc.*

According to the rule of the Common Law, the injured Party alone is permitted to sue for a trespass, the damages being deemed not legally assignable; and if there be an equitable Claimant, he may sue only in the name of the injured Party. In admiralty, however, the common practice is to have the suit conducted in the names of the real parties IN INTEREST." "...and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States." (F.R.Civ.P. 17).

The District Courts are prohibited from granting venue where the United States has less than "one-half of its capital stock..." of the Respondents/Libelant's Principal, the Fund and Bank. (28 USC § 1349). The government by becoming a corporator (See 22 USCA § 286e) lays down its sovereignty and takes on that of a private citizen \*28 USC § 3002(15) (A-C)). It can exercise no power which is not derived from the corporate charter. (See: The Bank of the United States vs. Platners Bank of Georgia, 6 L. Ed. (9Wheat) 244; U.S. vs BURR, 309 U.S. 242).

In this criminal case against GLENROY WALKER the REAL PARTY IN INTEREST is not the *de jure* "United States of America" or any "State", but "The Federal Reserve Bank" and "The International Monetary Fund", *i.e.*, "The Bank and the Fund". (22 USCA § 286, *et seq.*). Therefore the acts of government Officers to convene a Grand Jury Indictment was committed



*ultra vires* under fraud, and the detainment of the natural man on the land and living Soul, Glenroy: of the Family Walker, was done under force of arms and "Letters of Marque and Reprisal", *i.e.*, "recapture". (See 31 USCA § 5323). Such principles as "Fraud and justice never dwell together." (Wingate's Maxims 680), and "A right of action cannot rise out of fraud." (Broom's Maxims 297, 729).

In *Balzac v. People of Porto Rico*, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) Chief Justice William Howard Taft explains that: The United States District Court is NOT a true United States Court established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the corporate United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States Courts, in offering an opportunity to the people of resorting their *ultra vires* claim to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character of such Court from a mere territorial Court for the District of Columbia.

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes clarifies the distinction between a "United States District Court" and a "District Court of the United States" in *Mookini v. United States*, 303 U.S. 201 (1938). The term "District Courts of the United States," as used in the rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional Courts created under Article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative Courts, properly speaking, and are NOT District Courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial Court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a "District Court of the United States."

One of the great masters of Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing in the year 1828, Justice Marshall makes a very clear distinction between judicial Courts, authorized by Article III, and legislative (territorial) Courts, authorized by Article IV. Marshall even utilizes some of the



exact wording of Article IV to differentiate those courts from Article III "judicial power" Courts, as follows:

"These [territorial] Courts then, are **not constitutional Courts**, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general rights of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. **The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution**, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.

Although Admiralty jurisdiction can be **exercised in the States** in those Courts only which are established in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution, the same limitation **does not extend to the territories of the District of Columbia**. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of the State government." (*American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton*, 1 Pet. 511 (1828)) [emphasis added].

The United States District Court is not even an Article I Court, as Executive Agencies are outside of the Congress and judiciary, so the question of the jurisdictional integrity of this Court over the natural man on the land and living Soul, Glenroy: of the Family Walker, is again questionable and untenable under the law and the detainment of him is subject to the equitable remedy of Habeas.

Trustee has no record or evidence that any District of Columbia territorial Court within the Republic of New York state can demonstrate, show, or otherwise exhibit subject matter and *in personam* jurisdiction over Glenroy: of the Family Walker, as per his true and proper Christian appellation and *sui juris* legal status. ***"The omission of the Christian name by either***

*plaintiff or defendant in a legal process prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction, ..."*

**(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8<sup>th</sup> Ed., pg. 2287).**

*"A name spelled in all capital letters, or a name initialed, is not a proper noun denoting a specific person, but is a fictitious name, or a name of a dead person, or a nom de guerre."*

**(Gregg's Manual of English).**

*"Complaint must identify at least one Plaintiff (or Defendant) by true name; otherwise, no action has been commenced."* (Roe v New York (1970, SD NY) 49 FRD 279, 14 FR Serv 2d 437, 8 ALR Fed 670).

NOTE: The reasoning behind a true name is that neither a State, nor the United States, can pick up a pencil or sneeze, being nothing more than a "piece of paper". They cannot, therefore, assume the liability of actions nor write a Complaint. All activities carried on by governmental agencies are carried out by its Agents and Actors, not the United States, which is a corporate fiction entity that is restricted to the District of Columbia and its territories).

The U.S. Government Style Manual, Chapter 3, **requires** only the **names of corporate and other fictional entities, or those serving in corporate capacities to be in all capitalized letters.** Fictitious names exist for a purpose. **Fictions are invented to give Courts jurisdiction.** (Snider v. Newell 44 SE 354).

*"Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by parties, conferred by consent, or ignored by the Court."* (Babcock & Wilson v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (1970)).

*"Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and Courts may raise the issue sua sponte."* (FRCP, Rule 12(h)).

*"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defense that is never waived."* (FRCP, Rule 12(h)(3)).

*"Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived and can be raised at any time, even after trial."* (Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (D.C.

Pa., 1980)).

"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can even be raised on appeal after judgment on the merits." (Monaco v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 514 F. Supp. 357 (D.C.,Pa., 1981)).

"Judgment of Court lacking jurisdiction is void." (Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990)).

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Maine v Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250).

One of the hallmarks of subject matter jurisdiction is that it can be raised at any time, including on appeal. If the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction (or *in personam* jurisdiction), we would have to vacate its order. (Hawley v. Murphy, 1999 ME 127, ¶ 8, 736 A.2d 268, 271; M.R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)).

"Once jurisdiction is challenged, the Court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Court has no authority to reach merits, but rather should dismiss the action." (Melo v. U.S. 505 F 2d 1026).

"A judgment obtained without jurisdiction over the defendant is void." (Overby v. Overby, 457 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1970)).

**"Jurisdiction is of two kinds, of the subject matter and of the person, and both must concur or the judgment will be void in any case in which a Court has assumed to act, the difference being that jurisdiction of the subject-matter given by law cannot be conferred by consent, while jurisdiction of the person may be obtained by consent. (Rabbitt v. Frank c. Webber & Co., 130 N.E. 787, 788).**

There is marked distinction in law between a natural person and a legal person. One can

be both a legal fiction or a real human being, the other cannot. The Supreme Court has actually touched on this issue in Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 U.S. 47 (1893): Defendant was impleaded by the name of A. W. Becker. **Initials are no legal part of a name, the authorities holding the full Christian name to be essential.** (Wilson v. Shannon, 6 Ark. 196; Norris v. Graves, 4 Strob. 32; Seely v. Boon, 1 N. J. Law, 138; Chappell v. Proctor, Harp. 49; Kinnersley v. Knott, 7 C. B. 980; Turner v. Fitt, 3 C. B. 701; Oakley v. Pegler, (Neb.) 46 N. W. Rep. 920; Knox v. Starks, 4 Minn. 20, (Gil. 7) Kenyon v. Semon, (Minn.) 45 N. W. Rep. 10; Beggs v. Wellman, 82 Ala. 391, 2 South. Rep. 877; Nash v. Collier, 5 Dowl. & L. 341; Fewlass v. Abbott, 28 Mich. 270).

"Therefore, it is necessary that the record present the fact establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal." (Lowe v. Alexander 15C 296; People v. Board of Delegates of S.F. Fire Dept., 14 C 479).

If Glenroy: of the Family Walker is not subject to any constitutional Jurisdictions, he is also not subject to any Enactment made by any constitutionally created Legislature; and, if he is not subject to any constitutional Jurisdictions, he is also not subject to any jurisdiction presumed by any constitutionally created Executive Branch of Government; and, if he is not subject to any constitutional Jurisdictions, he is also not subject to any jurisdiction presumed by any constitutionally created Judiciary and Habeas is necessitated as a matter of law.

In the complete absence of any lawful and verified Oath or Affirmation made by a Public Officer to support any Constitution; or in the complete absence of proving a Higher Title to that Property Known and Described as the corporate fiction juristic person known as GLENROY WALKER, then **In Personam Jurisdiction does not exist**; and, in the complete absence of proving that a lawful and voluntary contract made by such corporate fiction juristic person,

pledging himself and/or his Property- Rights to certain specified performance, then **Subject Matter Jurisdiction does not exist**; and, in the complete **absence** of any **lawful and verified Complaint** made against such corporate fiction juristic person, wherein a **Real Injured Party** Claims a Damage, then **no criminal Jurisdiction can exist**; and, in the complete absence of the corporate fiction juristic person, being a Private Man upon the land, then **no Venue Jurisdiction can exist**; thus, in the complete absence of proving the existence of either *In Personam* jurisdiction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Venue Jurisdiction, **corporate governmental Jurisdiction over Glenroy: of the Family does not exist.**

Every Act perpetrated by any Constitutional Created Branch of government while absent Jurisdiction; every such Act being required to be made **unlawfully under Forces of Arms**; and every such act having been made without probable cause; then, every such Act is required to have been made as a **Trespass**, and/or other **Tort** upon Glenroy: of the Family Walker, and shall constitute as a civil case to be pursued against the perpetrator in an action At-Law for the recovery of damages.

#### **FACTS NOT INTRODUCED IN THE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY**

Matthew Podolsky, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was aware that what was provided as evidence by counsel for the defendants that was not presented at the Grand Jury proceedings. Counsel for the Plaintiff knew, or should have reasonably known, that the purported expert witness they presented to the Grand Jury did not possess the requisite knowledge for the technical subject matter of the criminal Complaint, and the Grand Jury was calculatedly impaneled by the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York in District of Columbia territorial capacity where such a Grand Jury might be more likely to return a True Bill in a case like this, because they only have jurisdiction over "crimes committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court for which it is impaneled. Thus, as more fully

detailed in this Memorandum of Law in Support of the Writ for Habeas Corpus, the indictment must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Even if the grand jury had jurisdiction, the charges still cannot stand based upon the proper legal status of Glenroy: of the Family Walker.

Even if the charges were applicable and the grand jury had jurisdiction, the Indictment must be dismissed for yet another reason: the State failed to provide exculpatory evidence.

**INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE  
FOR THE OFFENSES ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT**

The evidence presented to the Grand Jury was not sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Glenroy: of the Family Walker, committed the offenses of:

1. Wire Fraud Conspiracy;
2. Wire Fraud;
3. Money Laundering;
4. Engaging in a Monetary Transaction in Property Derived from Unlawful Activity,  
Specifically Wire Fraud; and
5. Aggravated Identity Theft.

Before a Defendant may be held to answer in District Court, the State is required to establish by “substantial and competent evidence” that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.

**The State Presented Insufficient Evidence of Intent**

Even putting aside the central problem that even if a document contains false information, that alone does not constitute forgery, the state presented insufficient evidence of intent to support all five (5) Counts. In order to sustain the Indictment, the State needs to show that the Defendant uttered, offered, disposed of or put off as true a forged writing with the intent

to defraud. No evidence was presented showing that any of the defendants ever possessed the requisite intent to defraud.

**THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENTED FALSE OR MISLEADING TESTIMONY**

As a matter of law if the U.S. Attorney is aware of any evidence which will explain away the charge, the district attorney shall submit it to the grand jury. "Exculpatory evidence" is defined as evidence that will explain away the charge, and the prosecutor is required to disclose all such evidence to the grand jury which he did not do.


**WHEREFORE**, I, Judith: of the Family McLaren, *Sui Juris*, solemnly affirm and verify that I have read the foregoing and know its contents to be true to the best of my knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated on my information or belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. I hereby declare under the penalty of perjury, under the laws of the New York Republic, that the foregoing is true and correct. This petition is being submitted upon good faith effort that is grounded in fact, warranted by existing law for the proper purposes it is being submitted for, and not to cause harassment and unnecessary delay or costs, so help me God.

Further, Trustee Sayeth Naught.

Dated: March 17, 2025.

*All Rights Explicitly Reserved,  
Without Prejudice and Without Recourse  
Per U.C.C. § 1-308*

Respectfully submitted,

  
Judith: of the Family McLaren, *Sui Juris*  
Trustee for the GLEN WALKER TRUST

61 Emerson Avenue  
New Rochelle New York 10801





NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Before me, on this 16<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2025, *Anno Domini*, Dr. Judith: of the Family McLaren, personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the natural woman on the land described herein, whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his authorized capacity, and that by his signature on this instrument executed the instrument.


Danielle F. Jones

Notary Public

My Commission Expires

**DANIELLE F. JONES**  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 01JC006766  
Qualified in Westchester County  
Commission Expires February 3, 2027

Seal



**NOTICE**

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